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Abstract
Background: Marriage benefits both individuals and societies, and is a fundamental determinant of health. Until recently
same sex couples have been excluded from legally recognized marriage in the United States. Recent debate around
legalization of same sex marriage has highlighted for anti-same sex marriage advocates and policy makers a concern that
allowing same sex couples to marry will lead to a decrease in opposite sex marriages. Our objective is to model state trends
in opposite sex marriage rates by implementation of same sex marriages and other same sex unions.
Methods and Findings: Marriage data were obtained for all fifty states plus the District of Columbia from 1989 through
2009. As these marriage rates are non-stationary, a generalized error correction model was used to estimate long run and
short run effects of same sex marriages and strong and weak same sex unions on rates of opposite sex marriage. We found
that there were no significant long-run or short run effects of same sex marriages or of strong or weak same sex unions on
rates of opposite sex marriage.
Conclusion: A deleterious effect on rates of opposite sex marriage has been argued to be a motivating factor for both the
withholding and the elimination of existing rights of same sex couples to marry by policy makers–including presiding
justices of current litigation over the rights of same sex couples to legally marry. Such claims do not appear credible in the
face of the existing evidence, and we conclude that rates of opposite sex marriages are not affected by legalization of same
sex civil unions or same sex marriages.
Citation: Dinno A, Whitney C (2013) Same Sex Marriage and the Perceived Assault on Opposite Sex Marriage. PLoS ONE 8(6): e65730. doi:10.1371/
journal.pone.0065730
Editor: Yamir Moreno, University of Zaragoza, Spain
Received May 23, 2012; Accepted May 3, 2013; Published June 11, 2013
Copyright: ß 2013 Dinno, Whitney. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: The authors have no support or funding to report.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: alexis.dinno@pdx.edu

(DOMA) restricted marriage to a legal union between one man
and one woman, and, responding to concerns that some states
would at some point be required to recognize same sex marriages
from other states, gave states the power to restrict marriage to
opposite sex couples and to not recognize same sex marriages from
other states. Thirty states have passed state DOMAs and statute
restrictions on marriage [9]. In most states, same sex couples are
still excluded from marriage and all same sex couples are excluded
from the federal benefits of marriage.
Massachusetts became the first state to allow same sex marriages
on May 17, 2004 following the ruling in Goodridge v. Department
of Public Health (440 Mass. 309 Mass: Supreme Judicial Court,
2003). Subsequently, Connecticut (November 12, 2008), Iowa
(April 27, 2009), New Hampshire (January 1, 2010), New York
(July 24, 2011), Vermont (September 1, 2009), Washington
(December 6, 2012), Maine (December 29, 2012), Maryland
(January 1, 2013) and the District of Columbia (December 18,
2009) have joined Massachusetts in legalizing same sex marriages
(see Table S1 in File S1). California’s Supreme Court ruled in
2008 that prohibiting same sex couples from marrying was
unconstitutional (In re MARRIAGE CASES, 2008, 43 Cal.4th
757). Same sex marriages were allowed in California between June
17th, 2008 and November 4th, 2008 during which time
approximately 18,000 couples were married [2]. In November

Introduction
Marriage has many values to individuals and societies. The
codification of marriage into U.S. Federal law alone provides over
a thousand conditions in which married couples are treated
differently than non-married couples. While some disadvantages
may result to married couples relative to unmarried couples in
these laws–as when there are married couple penalty provisions in
the tax code–most of these laws provide substantive benefits to
married couples relative to unmarried couples [1]. Marriage is well
understood as a basic determinant of the health of adults [2] and
their children [3,4]. Married individuals are less likely than nonmarried individuals to report their health as fair or poor, less likely
to suffer from physical ailments or report poor psychological
health, and across the lifespan report fewer health ailments [5].
Marriage is associated with greater life satisfaction and improved
mental health [6,7].
Until recently same sex couples in the United States have been
excluded from legally recognized marriage. The current national
policy debate over same sex marriage intensified in 1993, when in
the Hawaii’s Supreme Court ruled in Baehr v. Miike ‘‘that under
that states constitution, a marriage statute which restricts the status
and benefits of marriage to male-female couples discriminates on
the basis of sex.’’ [8] In 1996 the federal Defense of Marriage Act
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couples in the U.S. are currently boycotting marriage until it is
available to all [22,23]. Heterosexual and bisexual individuals and
opposite sex couples across the country have pledged to boycott
marriage until it is available to all by joining the National
Marriage Boycott, started after the passage of Proposition 8 [24].
The movement has been joined by churches as well who have
stopped signing marriage licenses in support of marriage equality
[25,26]. That some opposite sex couples will not marry unless
same sex marriages are lawful suggests, contrary to the prognostications of some opponents of same sex marriage, that a probable
increase in marriage rates over time will follow the legalization of
same sex marriage. The fact that some opposite sex couples are
postponing marriage until it is legal also for same sex couples
implies that there may also be a limited period of increase in
opposite sex marriages following enactment of same sex marriage
laws. A helpful anonymous reviewer of this article conjectures that
same sex marriage laws could be expected to have two kinds of
effects on rates of opposite sex marriage. Because by legitimizing
same sex relationships, same sex marriage laws could help reduce
the number of homosexuals living closeted lives and entering into
unhappy opposite sex marriages, such laws might both contribute
to decreased numbers of new opposite sex marriages, but also
reduce the number of opposite sex marriages likely to end in
divorce because the marriage was undertaken to keep up
heterosexual appearance by a homosexual participant. Therefore
caution must be taken about conflating causes of state-level rates of
opposite sex marriage with causes of individual-level or couplelevel participation in opposite sex marriage.
We aim to test the claims that rates of opposite sex marriage will
change as a result of same sex marriage or strong or weak same sex
union laws. Our primary formal hypothesis is twofold: (1) that
there is in the short or long-term a decreasing trend in rates of
opposite sex marriage following implementation of same sex
marriage laws, and (2) that states enacting same sex marriage laws
experience an increase in opposite sex marriages in the short-term
following implementation. These primary hypotheses are accompanied by four parallel secondary hypotheses for comparable
short-term and long-term effects following implementation of
strong same sex union laws providing most or all of the benefits of
marriage excepting the term marriage, and for weak same sex
union laws providing a small subset of the benefits of marriage.

of 2008, CA voters passed Proposition 8 [10] defining marriage as
one man and one woman. While the federal lawsuit challenging
California’s Proposition 8 is working its way through the appeals
process (See: Perry v. Brown, No. 10–16696, 9th Cir. Feb 7, 2012),
the 18,000 CA same sex marriage licenses issued in 2008 remain
valid (Strauss v. Horton, 2009, 46 Cal.4th 364).
In 2000, Vermont became the first state to allow civil unions for
same sex couples following a supreme court ruling that marriage
benefits could not be restricted to opposite sex couples (Baker v.
Vermont, 744 A. 2d 864 Vermont: Supreme Court, 1999).
Following Vermont, eleven states, including California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington as well as the
District of Columbia enacted legislation recognizing same sex
‘domestic partnerships’ or ‘civil unions’ which do or did extend
most or all of the state-level benefits of marriage, explicitly
reserving the legal designation of marriage to opposite sex couples
(see Table S1 in File S1). Several states, including Colorado,
Maine, Maryland, Wisconsin, and previous to stronger same sex
union laws, in California, the District of Columbia, New Jersey
and Washington enacted legislation recognizing same sex ‘domestic partnerships’ or ‘designated beneficiaries,’ which have provided
a limited subset of state-level benefits of marriage to registered
couples (see Table S1 in File S1).

Is Same Sex Marriage a Detriment to Opposite Sex
Marriage?
Opponents to legalization of same sex marriage have positioned
it as an ‘‘assault’’ [11] seeking to ‘‘weaken,’’ [12] ‘‘destroy’’ [13–
16] and ‘‘undermine’’ [17,18] opposite sex marriage. Anti-same
sex marriage lawmakers, advocates, and journalists have raised
concerns over the social effects of legalizing same sex marriage.
One such use of language has positioned same sex marriage as
literally harmful to opposite sex marriage: in a recent ruling of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Perry the
proponents argue ‘‘if the definition of marriage between a man
and a woman is changed, it would fundamentally redefine the
term from its original and historical procreative purpose. This shift
in purpose would weaken society’s perception of the importance of
entering into marriage to have children, which would increase the
likelihood that couples would choose to cohabitate rather than get
married’’ (Perry v. Brown, No. 10–16696, 111-112–9th Cir. Feb 7,
2012). David Blankenhorn, an expert witness for the defendants in
Perry testified under oath ‘‘that allowing same-sex marriage would
undermine respect for the unique status of traditional marriage,
and this could lead to further deinstitutionalization, including an
increase in out-of- wedlock births, divorce, etc’’ [19]. The
argument that same sex marriage literally destroys opposite sex
marriages translates directly to the question of what has happened
to rates of opposite sex marriage in states that allow same sex
marriage as compared to other states which do not? A similar
question has been posed in the academic arena with respect to
opposite sex marriage rates in Denmark, Norway, Sweden,
Iceland, and the Netherlands, and no significant change in
opposite sex marriage and divorce rates following enactment of
same sex marriage laws was found [20]. The academic literature
quantitatively assessing the effect of same sex marriage laws on
rates of opposite sex marriage in the U.S. is tiny, with, we believe,
just one study that analyzed a static model of marriage rates from
three years (1990, 2000, and 2004) and found a significant positive
association between ‘‘gay marriage, or full legal recognition like
civil unions’’ and state marriage rates [21].
Despite the argument that legalizing same sex marriage will
decrease the rates of opposite sex marriage, some opposite sex
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org

Materials and Methods
We model marriage rates in the thirteen states plus the District
of Columbia where same sex marriage or strong or weak same sex
union laws were implemented before 2009 relative to rates in the
remaining states..

Variables and Data
Marriages by state and year from 1988 to 2009 were obtained
from National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) marriage
publications [27–41], excepting Louisiana in 2006 when NCHS
data were unavailable. We used the Louisiana Department of
Health and Hospitals marriage rate figure for 2006 because
NCHS marriage figures from 2005 and 2007 are identical to the
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals figures for those
same years [42]. Mid-year (July, 1) estimates of the U.S.
population 18 years and older by state were obtained from the
U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates historical data by state
(http://www.census.gov/popest/data/historical/). The adult population in each state was used as this represented those ‘at risk’ of
marriage for purposes of analytic precision (and not intended as a
substantive redefinition marriage rate). The total number of
2
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Figure 1. Projected differences in annual opposite sex marriages in states enacting same sex marriage laws. Solid black lines represent
our modeled marriages in each year and state, and dashed black lines project opposite sex marriages if same sex marriage laws had not been enacted
in each state and year. Observed numbers of marriages are plotted as dots–note that the model follows very closely on the previous year’s observed
number of marriages. The 95% confidence intervals of the difference in predicted opposite sex marriages with and without same sex marriage laws in
effect are centered on the average of those two predictions. California licensed 18000 same sex marriages in 2008. Connecticut enacted a same sex
marriage law in 2008. Iowa enacted a same sex marriage law in 2009. Massachusetts enacted a same sex marriage law in 2004. Vermont enacted a
same sex marriage law in 2009.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0065730.g001

fit measures all disturbances to r in each time t (assumed
distributed normal), and
mri measures state-level variation in r (assumed distributed
normal).

marriages in each study state were adjusted downward by the
corresponding number of same sex marriages [43–46] appropriate
to each year from enactment to 2009. Because California did not
track same sex marriages in 2008, we used the widely-reported
figure of 18,000 same sex marriages in California during 2008 [2].
Marriage rates were calculated as all control states marriages
minus the total number of reported same sex marriages (i.e. zero in
most states and years), divided by the in-state adult population at
mid-year. The sample size was 1071.
Data for state same sex marriage, and strong and weak same sex
union laws were taken from public legislative and court records
(see Data S1). In each year, same sex marriage and union laws
were separately encoded in each state with a proportion
representing how much of that year the law was in effect. For
example, Massachusetts implemented same sex marriage on May
17, 2004, so during the first year following enactment the same sex
marriage variable for this state had the value 0.623 in 2004, the
value 1.0 in all subsequent years, and the value 0.0 in all previous
years. A multiplicative interaction term for same sex marriages
and strong same sex unions to capture those occasions when both
laws were in force simultaneously.

Data Analysis
We modeled state-level differences in opposite sex marriage
rates by differences in their enactment of same sex marriage laws
and strong and weak same sex union laws. Because marriage rates
are near-integrated, stationary models of change in marriage rates
cannot provide reliable estimates [53]. Instead, change in marriage
rates in year t and state i was fit using a single-equation
generalized error correction model (GECM) [49,50] (equation
2), permitting inference about the short term and long term effects
on opposite sex marriage rates of same sex marriage and union
laws. The GECM is an appropriate model both because GECMs
are appropriate for modeling near-integrated outcome variables
irrespective of a co-integration between outcome and predictor
variables [50,54], and because we infer that same sex marriage,
and strong and weak same sex unions all have level unit root (same
sex marriage and strong same sex unions have trend unit root,
although in some states weak same sex unions may be stationary)
from both Hadri’s test allowing for cross-sectional dependence and
subtracting cross-sectional means and the Im-Pesaran-Shin test
with a single lag and subtracting cross-sectional means. The
interaction term, msti , is stationary (see discussion of the
homogeneity of the error correction process in the discussion).
The random intercept term, b0i , was permitted to vary by state,
both to reflect the fact that states have different average changes in
marriage rates at equilibrium (i.e. it would be unreasonable to fit
the model by assuming, for example, that Hawaii and Mississippi
experience similar changes in marriage rates), and in order to
produce more accurate standard error estimates of the fixed effect
parameters.

Missing Data
Marriage data were missing for California in 1991 and for
Oklahoma for 2000–2004. The portion of missing marriage data
was 0.0045. We accounted for increased uncertainty in our
estimates due to data missingness using bootstrap estimation
maximization multiple imputation methods developed for missing
time series data with the amelie package version 1.5–5 for R.
version 2.14. [47] Reported are the results of identical analyses on
ten imputed data sets combined [48] to reflect increased
uncertainty due to data missingness. See File S1 for further details.

Non-stationarity of Marriage Rates
A first-lag random intercept model (1) provided an estimate of
r~0:961 (95% CI:0.953, 0.970), suggesting that marriage rates
during the study period were strongly autoregressive and nearintegrated (i.e. non-stationary) processes [49,50]. Application of
Hadri’s test for unit root in panel data allowing for cross-sectional
dependence and subtracting cross-sectional means [51] confirmed
that marriage rates in some states were neither trend stationary
(pv0:0001) nor level stationary (pv0:0001). The Im-PesaranShin test for unit root with a single lag and subtracting crosssectional means [52] failed to reject the null hypothesis that all
states contain unit roots both with time trend (p~0:2106) and
without (pw0:9810).
rti ~ri rt{1i zfti zmri ,

Drti ~b0i zbc ½rt{1i {ðmt{1i zst{1i zwt{1i zmst{1i Þ
zbDm Dmti zbm mt{1i zbDs Dsti zbs st{1i zbDw Dwti
zbw wt{1i zbDms Dmsti zbms mst{1i z ti zm0i ,
where:
t{1 in the subscript indicates the first lag for a variable in year
t;
D is the one-year change function for a variable (e.g.
Drti ~rti {rt{1i );
rti is the marriage rate in year t in the ith state;
mti is the proportion of year t that same sex marriage laws were
in force in the ith state;
sti is the proportion of year t that strong same sex union laws
were in force in the ith state;
wti is the proportion of year t that weak same sex union laws
were in force in the ith state;
msti is the multiplicative interaction of m and s in year t in the
ith state;

ð1Þ

where:
rti is the marriage rate at time t in state i,
ri measures autocorrelation and is permitted to vary for each
state,
rt{1i is the first lag of the marriage rate in each state,

PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org

ð2Þ

4

June 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 6 | e65730

Same Sex Marriage and Opposite Sex Marriage

Table 1. Effects of same sex marriage and union laws on opposite sex marriage rates (N = 1071).

estimatea

s:e:b

95%CIc

q{valued

Instantaneous short run effects of
same sex marriage w/o strong unions

0.0001

0.0013

20.0025, 0.0027

w0:9999

same sex marriage & strong unions

-0.0007

0.0014

20.0035, 0.0021

w0:9999

strong same sex unions w/o marriage

-0.0003

0.0007

20.0016, 0.0010

w0:9999

weak same sex unions

-0.0004

0.0006

20.0016, 0.0008

w0:9999

same sex marriage w/o strong unions

-0.0003

0.0015

20.0031, 0.0026

w0:9999

same sex marriage & strong unions

-0.0004

0.0031

20.0064, 0.0056

w0:9999

strong same sex unions w/o marriage

0.0000

0.0007

20.0014, 0.0014

w0:9999

weak same sex unions

0.0002

0.0007

20.0011, 0.0015

w0:9999

Lagged short run effects of

Long run run effects of
same sex marriage w/o strong unions

-0.0037

0.0152

20.0335, 0.0261

w0:9999

same sex marriage & strong unions

-0.0279

0.0754

20.1756, 0.1199

w0:9999

strong same sex unions w/o marriage

-0.0067

0.0075

20.0215, 0.0081

w0:9999

weak same sex unions

-0.0036

0.0083

20.0199, 0.0127

w0:9999

a

The arithmetic mean of the estimates from all ten imputed data sets.
Combined standard errors account for both within- and between-imputation estimate variance.
c
95% confidence intervals are given by the estimate +1:96  s:e:.
d
q-values are p-values adjusted upward to account for twelve multiple comparisons; compare to a=2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0065730.t001
b

b0i is the model constant for the ith state;
bc is the ‘correction rate’ at which marriage rates return to
equilibrium after a perturbation;
bDm is the ‘short run instantaneous effect’ of same sex marriage
law implementation in the absence of concurrent strong same
unions (bDs , bDw , and bDms are the ‘short run instantaneous effects’
of the respective covariates);
bm is the ‘lagged effect’ of same sex marriage law implementation in the absence of concurrent strong same unions (bs , bw ,
and bms are the ‘lagged effects’ of the respective covariates);
th
ti is the residual at time t in the i study state;
th
m0i is the model constant term for
 the i study state, and where

2
2
ti *N 0,s , and m0i *N 0,sm .

same sex marriages contemporaneous with strong same sex
unions were calculated using the delta method using the nlcom
command in Stata.

Results
All short term and long term effects of same sex marriages and
strong and weak same sex unions were close to zero and
statistically undifferentiable from the null hypothesis of no effect
on rates of opposite sex marriage with %95 confidence intervals
uniformly spanning zero (Table 1). This finding holds even for
very large values of a. Of course absence of evidence, is not the
same thing as evidence of absence [55]. Therefore we also
performed equivalence hypothesis tests on each of the dynamic
effects reported in Table 1 by posing as null hypotheses differences
between the reported effects and zero within a given tolerance, e,
deciding whether to reject them in favor of alternative hypotheses
of effects within the range {e,e by using uniformly most powerful
tests of equivalence [56]. We employed and report results for
liberal (e~0:5), strict (e~0:5) and very strict (e~0:125) tolerance
values (e is measured in units of t, see, for example, page 16 of
[56]). The results of the equivalence tests (Table 2) were
unambiguous: we rejected all null hypotheses of difference in of
the dynamic effects of favor of equivalence to no effect for liberal,
strict and very strict tolerances. In Table 2 we report p-values
adjusted for the False Discovery Rate (FDR) [57] only for
e~0:125, as the FDR adjustments make no difference within the
precision of of the reported figures for e~0:5 or e~0:25. Thus, we
found that adult rates of opposite sex marriage in states
implementing same sex marriage laws, both with and without
contemporaneous strong same sex union laws, were equivalent to
rates in states with no such laws, and we find that any differences
appear to due to chance alone, as reflected in very wide confidence
intervals around the predicted differences in states implementing
same sex marriage laws (Figure 1). Figure S1 in File S1 shows

The parameters in (2) provide different possible interpretations of our hypotheses in the form of short and long term
effects of same sex marriage and strong and weak same sex
union laws on opposite sex marriage rates. Short run
instantaneous effects are given by bDm , bDs , and bDw and, for
same sex marriages concurrent with strong same sex unions, by
(bDm zbDs zbDms ). Short run lagged effects (for example, for
marriage in the absence of concurrent strong same sex union
laws) are given by ðbm {bc {bDm Þ, and (for same sex
marriages concurrent with strong same sex unions) by
ðbm zbs zbms {3bc {bDm {bDs {bDms Þ. Finally, long run
effects (for example, for marriage in the absence of concurrent
strong same sex union laws) are given by ðbc {bm Þ=bc , and (for
same sex marriages concurrent with strong same sex unions) by
ð3bc {bm {bs {bms Þ=bc . We estimated the model in equation
(2) for all fifty states plus the District of Columbia in order to
evaluate the short and long term effects of same sex marriage
and union laws against opposite sex marriage rates in control
states using the xtmixed command in Stata version 11.2.
Estimates and standard errors for long run effects, lagged short
run effects and the instantaneous short run combined effect of
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org
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Table 2. Equivalence tests for dynamic effects on opposite sex marriage rates (N = 1071).

ta

~ 0:5 )b,c
P(DtDvC

~ 0:25 )b,c
P(DtDvC

~ 0:125 )b
(q)d P(DtDvC

same sex marriage w/o strong unions

0.0741

0.0000

0.0000

0.0078 (0.047)

same sex marriage & strong unions

20.5095

0.0000

0.0000

0.0191 (0.023)

strong same sex unions w/o marriage

20.4456

0.0000

0.0000

0.0176 (0.023)

weak same sex unions

20.5782

0.0000

0.0000

0.0208 (0.023)

same sex marriage w/o strong unions

20.1730

0.0000

0.0000

0.0108 (0.032)

same sex marriage & strong unions

20.1435

0.0000

0.0000

0.0099 (0.040)

strong same sex unions w/o marriage

0.0181

0.0000

0.0000

0.0051 (0.061)

weak same sex unions

0.3044

0.0000

0.0000

0.0141 (0.028)

same sex marriage w/o strong unions

20.2426

0.0000

0.0000

0.0126 (0.030)

same sex marriage & strong unions

20.3700

0.0000

0.0000

0.0270 (0.027)

strong same sex unions w/o marriage

20.8857

0.0000

0.0000

0.0286 (0.029)

weak same sex unions

20.4364

0.0000

0.0000

0.0260 (0.026)

Instantaneous short run effects of

Lagged short run effects of

Long run run effects of

a

The quotient of the Table 1 estimates and their standard errors.
~ e ~Fa~0:05,1,df~n{k,e where F is a quantile function of the noncentral F -distribution, the degrees of freedom are n{k~1060 from equation 2, and e
The critical value C
is the noncentrality parameter of F , and the P(DtDv~he ) is the cumulative density of F1,df~n{k,e at t [56]. Because under the null hypothesis of difference, one of the two
single-tails of the tests must be rejected, these p-values should be compared to a rather than to a=2 for the common interpretation of false rejection under null
hypotheses of difference [56,60].
c
The q-values for e~0:5 and e~0:25 are not explicitly reported because the figures remain just as the p-values within the precision of this table.
d
q~12p=i, where i is the position of ordered p-values from smallest to largest. When stepping down from largest to smallest i, all hypotheses are rejected including and
subsequent to the first with qƒ0:05 to control the FDR for twelve multiple comparisons.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0065730.t002
b

background section regarding individuals’ and couples’ motivations for choosing to marry a partner of the opposite sex or not, it
is clear that only further research including both individual-level
and state-level data will illuminate the effects of state marriage laws
on individuals’ and couples’ marriage choices. Such a study could
also examine the psychological effects of anticipated changes to
marriage law on marriage behavior.
The question of whether states ought to legally provide same sex
couples with the legal status of marriage, or a related, though less
regarded and less beneficial status of same sex union cannot be
answered solely in terms of the effect on opposite sex marriages.
However, a deleterious effect on rates of state rates of opposite sex
marriage has been argued to be a motivating factor for both the
withholding and the elimination of existing rights of same sex
couples to marry by policy makers–including presiding justices of
current litigation over same sex couples rights to legally marry.
Such claims do not appear credible in the face of the existing
evidence.
We began by framing marriage as a social determinant of
health. Marriage is an important social resource for the health of
both opposite sex and same sex couples, and their children. If rates
of opposite sex marriage are threatened by same sex marriage,
then part of the societal measure of that threat is the limiting of a
basic resource for the health of opposite sex couple-based families
(through, for example, pension benefits, hospital visitation rights,
immigration rights, child support, medical benefits due married
partners, affordable housing benefits, etc.) who remain unmarried.
This view is not supported by our findings. Conversely, if rates of
opposite sex marriage are not threatened by same sex marriage,
then the denial of marriage rights to same sex couples is a denial of
a basic resource for the health of same sex couple-based families.
This view is supported by our findings.

graphs for all states with any same sex marriage or same sex union
laws. The raw model parameter estimates and standard errors
from (2) are presented in Table S2 in File S1.
Across analyses of all ten imputed data sets, Hadri’s test for unit
root for panel data allowing for cross-sectional dependence and
subtracting cross-sectional means [51] failed to reject both the null
hypothesis that the error terms from all states were trend
stationary (mean p~0:9995) and the null hypothesis that the
error terms from all states were level stationary (mean p~0:9353):
we conclude that our model was appropriate to test our
hypotheses.
Models models with additional lags including up through the
fourth lags of marriage rates gave substantively similar results with
no difference in inferences from Tables 1 and 2.

Discussion
We found that state rates of opposite sex marriage in the U.S.
from 1989–2009 do not significantly differ when same sex
marriage and union laws are in force compared to when they
are not in force, contrary both to concerns raised by opponents of
same sex marriage and same sex civil unions, and to the positive
association reported by Langbein and Yost [21]. We found no
evidence of an increase in state-level opposite sex marriage rates
corresponding to a first year effect of same sex marriage,
contradicting the marriage equality hypothesis. Indeed, per our
equivalence tests, we found evidence of an absence of any effects.
Our analysis allows inference into changes in opposite sex
marriage rates by year and state, but we cannot readily translate
this inference into relationships between opposite sex couple-level
marriage decisions and state-level policies without committing the
ecological fallacy [58,59]. Given the nuances we raised in the
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this perspective against same sex marriage clearly ‘‘There is a
quantified impact of broken families’’ [13]. However, many more
divorce data are missing: twelve states are missing divorce data
from 1990–2009–California, Indiana, and Louisiana in particular
are missing most years’ data–and the overall rate of missingness is
7.93%. In addition, we encounter an analytic conundrum with
divorce rates by state, which present neither uniformly stationary
nor uniformly near-integrated processes, making the appropriate
choice of model unclear.

Limitations
More states currently have same sex marriage and union laws in
force than during our study period. Including such states would
provide greater precision in our estimates, and potentially
permitting an positive assessment of both the marriage equality
hypothesis and the threat to opposite sex marriage hypothesis.
Unfortunately there is a trend away from reporting the number of
marriages by state at the national level, and in many states, making
later data more difficult to obtain.
Our analysis assumes no state-level confounding factors are
biasing the estimates of the effects of same sex marriage and union
laws. This is appropriate in that our hypotheses were directly
informed by conjectures and assertions within a recent and
ongoing nation-wide discussion on the legitimacy of providing or
denying same sex couples the right to legally recognized marriage,
and this discourse has not generally been characterized by
conjecture about confounding effects. For example, presiding
justices making the argument that same sex marriage could
discourage opposite sex marriage have not suggested that this
effect varies depending on economic conditions, or on demographic makeup within a state. However, further research in the
subject may produce insights in examining such possibilities both
at the state and individual level.
Our model assumes that the effects of same sex marriage and
union laws on change in rates of opposite sex marriage do not
differ by state. If this assumption poorly reflects the reality (e.g.
same sex marriages increase rates of opposite sex marriage in some
states, but decrease rates of opposite sex marriage in other states),
we may be blind to nuances of the cultural force of same sex
marriages and unions. Unfortunately, the size of the current data
set, in particular, the limited number of states and years
implementing same sex marriage or union laws, provides poor
power to discriminate random effects at the state level. Relatedly,
differences in same sex marriage or same sex union laws in
neighboring states might produce cross-border marriage effects
which our data and study design cannot readily address. This is a
complex issue, for many reasons: some states require residency for
a marriage; there is likely limited legal benefit to being married in
another state when it is illegal in one’s own; the role of geographic
isolation (e.g. California versus Rhode Island) in limiting travel.
While such ‘marriage migration’ may mismatch the numerator
(marriages) from the denominator (marriageable-age population),
the random intercept term m0i captures state-specific differences in
marriage rates which are relatively constant across the study’s
duration.
We also made an assumption of homogeneity of error
correction rates by state, and by same sex marriage or union
laws. This assumption appears reasonable for two reasons. First,
the error correction process is dominated by the first lag of
marriage rates, and the lagged same sex marriage and union terms
cancel with it to produce near-zero estimates. Second, models
accounting for only one kind of the same sex marriage, strong, or
weak same sex union laws (see Tables S3–S8 in File S1) produced
very similar values for bc as that which we report here.
Ideally, we would have wanted to extend this analysis to
divorce: inherent in the critiques against same sex marriage
described above are concerns about opposite sex divorce. For
example, former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee articulated

Conclusion
We conclude that there is no relationship between implementation of same sex marriage or strong or weak same sex union laws
and rates of opposite sex marriage. Because the history of same sex
marital rights is young in the U.S., ongoing examination of these
relationships is warranted.
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document (in.docx format) containing Table S1: State same sex
marriage and strong and weak same sex union laws; details of the
imputations, including equations S1–S3; Table S2: Fixed and
random effect model estimates of change in opposite sex marriage
rates by state and year; Figure S1 Projected differences in annual
opposite sex marriages in states enacting same sex marriage or
strong or weak same sex union laws; separate generalized error
correction models for same sex marriage and strong and weak
same sex union laws, including equations S4–S6; Table S3: Effects
of only same sex marriage laws on opposite sex marriage rates;
Table S4: Fixed and random effect model estimates of change in
opposite sex marriage rates by state and year for same sex
marriage only; Table S5: Effects of only strong same sex union
laws on opposite sex marriage rates; Table S6: Fixed and random
effect model estimates of change in opposite sex marriage rates by
state and year for strong same sex unions only; Table S7: Effects of
only weak same sex union laws on opposite sex marriage rates;
Table S8: Fixed and random effect model estimates of change in
opposite sex marriage rates by state and year for weak same sex
unions only; and References S1.
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Data S1 Supporting Information Data S1 is a spreadsheet
(in.xlsx format) containing Sheet S1: Reported US marriages by
state and year (annotated); Sheet S2: Reported number of US
same sex marriages by state and year; and Sheet S3: Estimated US
population age 18+ by state and year: US Bureau of the Census.
(XLSX)
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